微軟巨資併下諾基亞，芬蘭國民品牌從此易主；市場人士認為，這是微軟在行動終端被Google、蘋果圍堵下，反攻行動領域的最後一擊，決定微軟在行動裝置生死。
PC 作業系統巨人微軟宣布以 54.4億歐元購併昔日手機龍頭諾基亞，併購內容包括業務硬體和專利組合，希望此舉能為 Windows行動裝置注入活水，在谷歌（Google）和蘋果相爭的局面下開出一條活路。
當前智慧型手機作業系統( OS )的龍頭老大是 Google 的 Android，去年市占68%，今年更提升為72%，而蘋果 iOS 去年和今年的市占則持平，都是18%，僅手機數量有提升，而Windows 作業系統今年市占大約4%。
相較 2011年 Google 併摩托羅拉是意在專利，這次微軟併了硬體見長的諾基亞是寄望「軟硬整合」以突圍。
拓墣產業研究所所長楊勝帆說，微軟在移動終端始終走不出去，所以需要和最強的硬體廠商合作；而 Android 則不一樣，Android 的服務和軟體已經發展到一個規模，還在走上坡，Google先前併購摩托羅拉只是為了專利，發現專利沒鞏固好，被蘋果追著打，所以儘管併了摩托羅拉，隨後還是傾向和廠商如華碩等合作。
而現在市面上，軟硬整合的行動終端公司除了蘋果，又多了一家微軟。
業界人士預估，微軟併了諾基亞後，首先要解決的是Windows觸控平台上的盲點和瓶頸。有了諾基亞這麼強的硬體載具，微軟可以徹底研究包括專利等，再微調軟體，加強整合度，不然手機等裝置和PC永遠都不是那麼契合。
至於微軟這麼做會不會踩到與其他合作廠商的底線？分析師指出，目前廠商和微軟合作推出的手機除了諾基亞，占比並不大，所以微軟不太擔心這些廠商的反應，但也可以說，沒有餘力去擔心。
分析師指出，目前Google已經坐穩移動終端市占率龍頭寶座，今年72%的市占率很難再往上，以今年9億支手機的量計，有6億多支是Google的客戶，而Google最好的策略就是要抓緊這些用戶，最好是把他們複製到其他如Google Glass等新平台上，讓用戶更黏Google的服務，有助Google廣拓財源。
但相對地，微軟在行動終端連第1步都還沒踏穩，已經蹉跎好幾年，不像Google有餘裕去想下一步，只要能在行動市場吃下超過10%以上市占，這次的併購就有價值。
網路上對於微軟的併購也有很不留情的批評，不少網友表示「兩隻貓加在一起，也不會變成一隻老虎。」不過對微軟而言，不發揮團結力量大的效應，面對老虎，恐怕下場更慘。
分析師表示，微軟這一步突圍策略若踏得成功，Windows智慧手機生態體系死水有機會起死回生，其他合作廠商看到微軟平台做大了，會更願意加入，如此才能創造平台活水。所以這次併購算是微軟在行動裝置的重大反擊，若再不成功，那真可宣布微軟在行動終端玩完了。
狂削專利費 微軟遭反噬
Android開放平台 橫掃市場
相較於微軟對下游硬體裝置廠商動輒伸手要作業系統或軟體授權金，迅速崛起的Google打著開放平台且免費的旗幟，不僅在行動裝置作業系統市占率遙遙領先微軟，甚至在PC瀏覽器市場逐步威脅到微軟的霸主地位。
就算諾基亞已與微軟合作多年，但諾基亞使用微軟WP平台手機，每支還是得付給微軟約五到十美元專利使用費，其他手機品牌每支更達十美元以上。
微軟愛錢愛到什麼地步？最誇張的是，連手機廠商使用對手Google的Android平台，微軟也以宣稱掌握Android關鍵技術專利為由，讓這些廠商因擔心捲入與微軟的專利糾紛，而乖乖掏錢。包括三星、HTC、LG、ZTE等多家手機廠或代工廠，都被迫與微軟簽訂相關專利授權協議。
若微軟對每一台Android裝置收取一美元專利授權金，那依Android平台相關產品的銷量，微軟一年就可收到約四千三百萬美元；若一台收取四美元，收入更達十七億美元。
Google在二○一一年八月宣布斥資一二五億美元收購摩托羅拉行動部門，似為微軟「軟硬通吃」樹立了美好「錢」景。但事實是，摩托羅拉從去年至今年第二季都虧損，成為Google獲利的拖油瓶，且迄今也未推出像樣的產品。
更別忘了，Google的Android平台分文不取，或許就因微軟萬事皆談錢，與下游硬體裝置廠商是交易、非夥伴關係，才讓Google有機可乘；若微軟買下諾基亞的目的，只是想擴大在行動裝置產品的市占、以便未來收取更多授權金，那結果只會是夥伴漸稀、敵人漸眾，霸主地位遲早崩潰。
Gartner：中階手機廝殺更激烈
微軟宣布收購諾基亞(Nokia)手機事業，為全球智慧型手機版圖丟下震撼彈，不過，國際研究暨顧問機構 Gartner表示，此併購案對宏達電(2498-TW)不會有任何影響，但宏達電要擔心的是內部人員是否足夠了解中階手機？能夠和大陸手機廠競爭嗎？推出中階手機，能夠獲利嗎？
宏達電董事長王雪紅不斷強調，HTC是中國人的品牌，絕對不會被併購，但爆發研發副總、首席設計師簡志霖等人出走洩密案，接下來突顯的問題是HTC研發團隊極待整頓，宏達電未來在研發創新是否要有新的佈局？
Gartner行動通訊首席分析師呂俊寬表示，宏達電面臨3大挑戰。一是對中階手機定位不明確，中階手機和高階手機市場定位不同、消費者不同，宏達電未必能滿足中階手機消費者的需求。第二、中階手機性價比高，也就是消費者又要性能好，又要價格低，和高階手機使用族群什麼都要求最好、對價格較不苛求的特性完全不同。第三、宏達電切入中階手機後，能否獲利，是一大疑慮，特別是中階手機市場競爭更為激烈。
Why I think the $7.2 billion Microsoft-Nokia deal is a terrible idea
In 2007, when Apple launched its iPhone, a few saw it for what it was — an assault on business as usual in the telecom industry. It helped shift the focus from voice to data. It turned the phone into an anywhere computing device. The arrival of Android only added fuel to the fire — telephony of the past was no more, instead it became a game of software and services.
In case of Google, many of those services come from within. For Apple, those services eventually took the shape of third-party applications (or apps as we call them now.) Six years later, what we have is a world that’s remarkably different — the erstwhile leaders have fallen on hard-times. New giants have taken center stage in an industry that still finds itself in continuous flux.
On the winning side of the equation thus far — Apple, Google, Amazon, Qualcomm, and Samsung. In the loss column you can include Blackberry, Palm, Microsoft and Nokia.
Today, Nokia announced that Microsoft will buy its devices business for shade over $7.15 billion in an attempt to mimic the Apple/Google strategy of owning the hardware, software and services. The reports of this possible merger had emerged as early as June 2013, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Fly like an eagle, fall like a turkey
Some will argue that the deal is good for both companies — after all, the number three spot in the mobile OS is still up for grabs. I am not one of those. Although Microsoft is still printing money and can afford a multi-billion dollar gamble, what if this doesn’t work out? Can it afford to fritter away a few more years on chasing shadows? There is nothing in the deal than inspires confidence that it will turn two also-rans into champions.
Vic Gundotra, Google’s sharp-elbowed senior executive who, like Android co-creator Andy Rubin, wanted to win over Nokia and bring it into the Android camp about two years ago, put it best when he tweeted: “Two turkeys don’t make an Eagle.” And while he might have ruffled some feathers in Microsoft and Nokia offices, his observation wasn’t that off the mark. Microsoft makes a mobile OS, that the market doesn’t seem to want. Nokia smartphones sales make drying paint seem like a John Woo thriller. It doesn’t matter from which angle you look, the combination of these two companies into a single entity doesn’t add up.
Stephen Elop’s tenure as the chief executive of Nokia would at best earn him a B-minus grade, and that much because he inherited a company that was spiraling down before he showed up. The “bet the farm on Windows Phone move” however was all him. Since taking over the reins at Nokia in 2010, Elop has seen smartphone sales shrink faster than a $5-dollar linen shirt.
If anything, Elop’s tenure at the top of Nokia will be remembered for the years when Nokia became irrelevant in the the mobile handset business. In a post, “The End of the (Nokia) Raj”, I hinted at a future of irrelevance for Nokia. The fall from grace came much sooner than even I thought. Elop is now being widely tipped to take over Microsoft as its next chief executive, replacing outgoing Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer. Given his track record, if I were a Microsoft shareholder, I would have to pause and gulp hard before putting the future of the company in his hands.
You can’t buy the future in a bargain bin
Microsoft might actually have gotten itself a bargain. It is paying about $5 billion for Nokia’s device business and will pay about $2 billion for licensing Nokia’s patents. In May 2011, there was talk of Microsoft buying Nokia’s mobile device business for $30 billion. The money saved is one thing, but the question that needs to be asked is: what has fundamentally changed with this deal?
If you ask me, nothing really has changed. There is a certain quiet desperation in Microsoft’s move. So far, there has been apathy for the Windows Phone operating system — it accounted for about 3.7 percent of the total smartphone shipments during the second quarter of 2013, according to market research firm IDC. There was only really one company that was building Microsoft phones, and that was Nokia. During the second quarter of 2013, Nokia sold a record 7.4 million Lumia smartphones — only after Nokia cut the average selling price by 20 percent.
Microsoft and Nokia are two sides of the same coin and now they are both under the same corporate umbrella. Buying Nokia and adding 32,000 new employees adds a further and deeper layer of complexity to a sprawling Microsoft that is trying to figure out who it is, and what it wants to be in the future. It can’t let go of the legacy past — Windows and Office still print money for the company — but its future path is littered with mines. The company essentially fired (though not in as many words) its chief executive officer.
Microsoft’s legacy as a PC monopoly holder made it incapable of handling the fast changing, rapidly shifting post-mobile world. And now for the next year Microsoft will be distracted by integrating the two companies — all at a time when Samsung will be releasing a barrage of new phones, Google will be improving on Moto X and Android and, lest anyone forget, Apple will have a trick or two up its sleeve. Oh, by the way, there is that other Seattle-based company: Amazon has been quietly working on its own phones and has plans to take on the current smartphone establishment. And they don’t even care about making a profit — they just want marketshare.
In theory, Microsoft is getting a great engineering team, a great product design team and a great brand (well, better than Windows Phone). However in reality what it is not getting are the intangibles. In the course of my seven odd years of reporting on Nokia, I have met many talented people and many of them had a lot of pride in working for the company. It was the shining achievement of Nokia and its engineering culture. Even when things got bad over past few years, many believed that Nokia had the talent to help things around. I made a few phone calls this evening, and all I hear is a sense of quiet despondency and loss of hope. Working for Microsoft isn’t working for Nokia, is a common refrain.
分析
- Microsoft 結合 Nokia 「軟硬整合」不會使 Microsoft 獲利增加，也無法對抗 Google 動作越來越快之產品策略與新功能推出，Google 市值已經超越 Microsoft 許多，如今 Google 已經推出 Nexus 7、Chromecast、Moto X、Google Fiber 四項產品，讓 Google 全面往硬體產品衝擊 Microsoft 高價策略。
- 台廠要相當小心，依網路拜訪率統計，Google Quickoffice 結合 Android、Chromebook、Chromecast、Chrome瀏覽器的應用程序和內容將逐漸吃掉 Microsoft 之 PC 市場，取而代之是低價之 Android Tablet、Smart Phone 及 Chrome OS 相關產品；
- Google 免費 Quickoffice 會先影響 Android 、iOS 之 Microsoft Office 使用者，吃掉非企業之使用者，人們就會開始逐漸改變 NB、TV 之應用程序使用習慣。
- 從價格看 429美元 ~ 690美元之 Window 8 Laptop 比起 199 美元 ~ 299美元 Chromebook 將是 2013 第四季 ~ 2015年 Microsoft 與 Google 主要競爭之關鍵點，由成本預估 Chromebook 還有降價空間，但 Window 8 Laptop 降價空間是有限的，配上 Google drive、Quickoffice、Chrome 應用程序，Microsoft 將面臨更大壓力；
- 微軟在行動裝置生死之一戰 - 併購諾基亞「軟硬整合」極可使 Microsoft 獲利減少。
